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The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), established in 1993, is a civil society initiative to 
promote an ongoing dialogue between the principal partners in the decision-making and 
implementing process. The dialogues are designed to address important policy issues and to 
seek constructive solutions to these problems. The Centre has already organised a series of 
such dialogues at local, regional and national levels. The CPD has also organised a number 
of South Asian bilateral and regional dialogues as well as some international dialogues. 
These dialogues have brought together ministers, opposition frontbenchers, MPs, business 
leaders, NGOs, donors, professionals and other functional groups in civil society within a 
non-confrontational environment to promote focused discussions. The CPD seeks to create 
a national policy consciousness where members of civil society will be made aware of 
critical policy issues affecting their lives and will come together in support of particular 
policy agendas which they feel are conducive to the well being of the country. 
 
In support of the dialogue process the Centre is engaged in research programmes which 
are both serviced by and are intended to serve as inputs for particular dialogues organised 
by the Centre throughout the year.  Some of the major research programmes of CPD 
include The Independent Review of Bangladesh's Development (IRBD), Governance 
and Development, Population and Sustainable Development, Trade Policy Analysis 
and Multilateral Trading System and Leadership Programme for the Youth. The 
CPD also carries out periodic public perception surveys on policy issues and 
developmental concerns. 
 
Dissemination of information and knowledge on critical developmental issues continues 
to remain an important component of CPD’s activities. Pursuant to this CPD maintains 
an active publication programme, both in Bangla and in English. As part of its 
dissemination programme, CPD has decided to bring out CPD  Occasional and 
Working Paper Series on a regular basis. Dialogue background papers, investigative 
reports and results of perception surveys wzhich relate to issues of high public interest 
will be published under its cover. This Series will also include draft research papers and 
reports, which may be subsequently published by the CPD. 
 
The present paper, Interpreting Cancun: Experience and Lessons for Bangladesh has 
been prepared under the CPD programme on Trade Policy Analysis and Multilateral 
Trading System. This programme aims at strengthening institutional capacity in 
Bangladesh in the area of trade policy analysis, negotiations and implementation. The 
programme, inter alia, seeks to project the civil society’s perspectives on the emerging 
issues emanating from the process of globalization and liberalization. The outputs of the 
programme will be available to all stakeholder groups including the government and 
policymakers, entrepreneurs and business leaders, and trade and development partners. 
 
This paper has been prepared by a team which included Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya, 
Executive Director, Professor Mustafizur Rahman, Research Director and Dr Ananya 
Raihan, Research Fellow, CPD.  
 
Assistant Editor: Anisatul Fatema Yousuf, Head (Dialogue & Communication), CPD 
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Interpreting Cancun:  
Experience and Future Strategies for Bangladesh 
 
 
DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND AGENDA 
 
The Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the WTO held in Cancun, Mexico during September 
10-14, 2003 will go down in the annals of multilateral trade negotiations as one of belied 
expectations and missed opportunities. Also, it will be remembered, at the same time, as 
a testing ground of the limits of the conflict resolution capacity of a global system that 
strives to reconcile the conflicting perspectives of a membership that has strong 
individual and group-based agendas. For Bangladesh the importance of putting Cancun 
experience, the process, outcome and future implications under critical and careful 
scrutiny is to draw the necessary insights and lessons from what has happened in 
Cancun, what were the major issues debated and discussed, and where do we go from 
here. The WTO is going to stay, and Bangladesh is going to stay in WTO. So it is 
critically important to understand how the state of play in the WTO is going to evolve in 
the post-Cancun era, and how Bangladesh should do her homework in this context.  
   
The Cancun Backdrop 
The Cancun Ministerial took place in the backdrop of three important developments in 
the WTO: firstly, the Cancun Ministerial was the first Ministerial to be held to discuss 
the negotiations carried under the Doha Development Round Agenda (DDRA) and as 
such it was an opportunity to assess the progress achieved in the negotiations in Geneva; 
secondly, for the developing countries and the LDCs, Cancun was an opportunity to test 
the ‘development’ dimensions of the multilateral trading regime, and thirdly, Cancun 
was to provide directions to the way the DDRA was to be pursued till December 31, 
2004 when the work agenda was to be completed for the member countries to endorse 
the outcome under the Single Undertaking of the WTO.  
 
Parallel to these, the negotiations carried out in Geneva, on issues under DDRA created 
deep divisions amongst the WTO member countries. Cancun was expected to provide a 
platform to narrow down the differences and reach convergence of opinion through 
trade-offs which would facilitate the work of the negotiators in Geneva to arrive at 
negotiated agreements, which could then be accepted by all under a Single Undertaking.  
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CANCUN MANDATE 
As decided at the Doha Ministerial Meeting, the Cancun Meeting was mandated to 
provide mid-term direction to the work on the Doha Development Round Agenda, which 
the Geneva based missions of the WTO member countries were entrusted with to carry 
forward. Thus the primary objective of the Cancun Ministerial was to take stock of the 
ongoing negotiations, which basically had two distinct components: firstly, to provide 
directions for successful conclusion of the incomplete Built-in and Continuing Agenda of 
the Uruguay Round which essentially included negotiations in the areas of agriculture, 
services, trade related intellectual property rights, textile and clothing, and investment 
measures; and secondly, to provide guidance on launching negotiations in new areas as 
agreed under the DDRA. Cancun was expected to be an opportunity to test the bottom 
lines and flexibilities of the member countries and the trade-offs they were willing to 
negotiate with respect to the abovementioned mandates. 
B BO OX X: :   C CA AN NC CU UN N   M MA AN ND DA AT TE E   
 
- take stock of the progress made in Geneva negotiations, provide the necessary political guidance, and arrive 
at negotiated decisions. 
- take decisions by explicit consensus on modalities of negotiations on Singapore issues. 
- receive reports: 
 
(i)  from Committee on Trade & Environment on issues in para. 32 with recommendations, 
where appropriate, for future action, including desirability of negotiations; 
(ii)  on technical assistance and capacity building in the field of trade and environment; 
(iii)  from General Council on: 
 
¾  progress on those elements of the Work Programme which do not involve negotiations; 
¾  further progress in the continued e-commerce work programme; 
¾  recommendations for action on small economies; 
¾  progress in trade, debt and finance examination; 
¾  progress in trade and technology transfer examination; 
 
(iv)  from DG on: 
 
¾  implementation and adequacy of technical cooperation and capacity-building 
commitments; 
¾  all issues affecting LDCs, following coordination with other IF agency heads; 
¾  "Implementation of the Commitment by Ministers to Facilitate and Accelerate 
the Accession of the LDCs" (status report); 
 
(v)  from TRIPS Council on: 
 
¾  recommendations following its examination of the scope and modalities for 
non-violation complaints under Article XXIII of GATT 94. 
•  Agriculture negotiations: 
 
¾  submission of draft schedules (no later than date of the Fifth Session). 
•  TRIPS negotiations on the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration 
of geographical indications for wines and spirits: 
¾  conclusion of negotiations (by Fifth Session). 
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CANCUN PROCESS 
 
Meetings in Geneva  
The preparation for the Cancun Ministerial did actually begin from the kick off date of 
Doha Round negotiations in January, 2002. As mandated in Doha, the negotiations under 
the DDR were carried out under 22 negotiating committees, 5 working groups and 4 
working parties. The process of consultation was quite extensive. Only in the year 2002 a 
total of 5224 meetings took place on various agenda. Record number of documents 
(request: 160, offer: 30) was submitted by the negotiating countries under the GATS. 
The number of proposals on agriculture alone was 107, while for market access the 
number was 26.  
Missed Deadlines 
There is some controversy that the Doha Round Agenda was a little ambitious. Crucially 
important negotiations were envisaged in the areas of agriculture and services where 
there were significant differences as regards approach and substance amongst the major 
players and among groups of countries. There were particular deadlines to be met before 
Cancun, and negotiations on a whole range of issues were to be completed before the 
January 1, 2005 deadline. Although, the various negotiating committees and groups tried 
their best, differences in a number of key issues proved to be irreconcilable and as a 
result deadlines for negotiations on individual issues were missed.  
 
The first missed deadline was July 31, 2002, when the Members failed to arrive at “clear 
recommendations for decision” as regards the Special and Differential Treatment 
(S&DT) for the developing countries and LDCs. The only progress was that the General 
Council agreed to set up a “Monitoring Mechanism” for S & DT. The new deadline was 
set for December 31, 2002. However, by year-end 2002, agreement could only be 
reached on four of the 85-plus proposals submitted since February, 2002. Since the 
discussion ended in a stalemate, a new third dead-line was set for February 10, 2003. 
This deadline was also missed. In April 2003, the new Chairman of the General Council 
decided to proceed on the premise that “all 88 proposals will be addressed, without 
prejudging the results”. The request for clarification of the Doha mandate on S&DT was 
brushed aside. The objective of the Doha mandate was to make meaningful progress in 
the negotiations on S&DT since this was perceived to be making the Doha 
“Development” round truly developmental. However, both procedural and agreement -
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specific issues dominated the discussion in the run-up to the Cancun Ministerial. The 
discussion, however, brought to the fore the insurmountable gaps between what the DCs 
and LDCs expected from the negotiations and what the developed nations had 
undertaken by way of commitments and financial responsibility. 
 
Another important mandate of Doha was negotiations on Implementation related Issues, 
for which the deadline was also set at December 31, 2002. However, the members were 
unable to reach any agreement on the issues. The interpretation of the Doha mandate was 
itself a major issue here. Owing to the crosscutting nature of the implementation issues, 
several deadlines were set for addressing those. July 31, 2002 was the deadline for the 
decision on growth of the textile quota, review of the provisions of the Subsidy and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement related to countervailing duty 
investigations, and S&DT which was mentioned earlier. For resolving the debate on anti-
dumping practices the deadline was set at mid-November 2002. By December 15, 2002, 
the Committee on SCM was to grant extensions for the calendar year 2003 for export 
subsidy programmes notified by developing countries. Committee on Customs 
Valuation, Committee on Market Access, TRIPs Council and other relevant WTO bodies 
were to report on progress as regards the issues and concerns raised by the developing 
countries. For most of the deadlines, either the work was  postponed or the targeted dates 
were missed. Out of a total of 95 points raised in the area of implementation only 5 
points have been addressed adequately. The December 31, 2002 deadline for TRIPs and 
Public Health was also missed and only on August 30, 2003 a decision was made in this 
regard, which is considered as the only early harvest of Doha Round Negotiations during 
the run up to Cancun. However, the important procedural issues still remained 
unresolved.   
 
As was anticipated and feared, from the very beginning Agricultural Negotiations 
became the centre of attention in Doha Round Negotiations and WTO Members were 
unable to adopt agricultural modalities before the end of March 2003 deadline. As a 
consequence, subsequent negotiations, which were envisaged following this deadline, 
were stalled. Against this backdrop, on August 13, 2003, the EU and US came up with a 
joint proposal which sparked real negotiations, as a counterproposal was jointly tabled by 
11 Cairns Group developing countries along with China, Ecuador, India, Mexico and 
Peru, along with a group of six LMG countries which included Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Kenya, Nicaragua, Panama and Sri Lanka. These countries subsequently 
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became known as G-20 plus. Efforts to reach consensus on outstanding issues in 
agricultural negotiations did not succeed, and in Cancun the contending parties waited 
for consultations and guidance at political level. 
 
Negotiations under the GATS were relatively less controversial as compared to the 
negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. However, here also the negotiations 
proceeded at a slow pace and in the process both the deadlines in Geneva were missed. 
By end-June 2002, WTO Members were to submit initial bilateral market access requests 
to their trading partners. March 31, 2003 was the deadline for responding to the requests 
received with initial offers. 30 countries responded to the initial requests made by other 
countries. The negotiation schedule was largely undermined by initiating the offer-
request process without substantive progress on other outstanding agendas of the 
Uruguay Round such as assessment of impact of trade liberalisation on the economies of 
developing countries, conclusion of negotiations on WTO rules in GATS and the like. 
On September 03, 2003 the special modalities for LDCs had been adopted, which was 
considered to be yet another of the early harvest before Cancun. However, it made no 
impact on the major stream of negotiations.  
 
Having missed the May 31, 2003 deadline for reaching an understanding on modalities 
(parameters and approach) for non – agricultural market access negotiations, countries 
were focusing on an annex to the draft Ministerial Declaration issued in late August.  
Here also the WTO member countries failed to agree on the formula of and approach to 
tariff reductions. 
 
RUN – UP TO CANCUN 
 
The Cancun process was facilitated by the Mini-Ministerials which provided an 
opportunity for the Ministers of the Member countries to sound out their positions, 
minimise the gaps, and take joint stand with like minded groups of countries as regards 
various proposals under discussion in Geneva. Four such mini-Ministerial Meetings were 
held during the run-up to Cancun Ministerial. Bangladesh, as a leader of the LDC group 
in the WTO, was appointed as the Vice-Chairman of the Cancun Ministerial in the 
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Table 1. WTO Mini-Ministerial During the Run up to Cancun 
Place Date  Participating 
Countries 
Issues 
Sydney, Australia  November 14-
15, 2002 
25  TRIPs and Public Health, S&DT, NAMA, 
Singapore Issues 
Tokyo, Japan  February 14-16, 
2003 
23  NAMA, Agriculture, Services, Singapore Issues 
Sharm-el-Shaikh, 
Egypt 
June  21-22,  2003  29  NAMA, S&DT, TRIPs and Public Health, 
Implementation Issues, Singapore Issues 
Montreal, Canada  July 28-30, 2003  27  Agriculture, Development and General Balance 
of Discussions leading to Cancun 
 
The LDCs organised a Mini-Ministerial Meetings of their Trade Ministers in Dhaka 
during May 31-June 02, 2003. The Dhaka Declaration emerged from this Meeting 
adopted a prioritised list of proposals keeping in view the upcoming Cancun Ministerial 
Meeting. Prior to the Dhaka LDC Ministerial Meeting a Global Civil Society Forum was 
held in Dhaka during May 29-30, 2003 which was organised by the Centre for Policy 
Dialogue in association with six international and regional civil society organisations. 
The forum adopted its own declaration and a number of its recommendations found their 
place in the Dhaka LDC Ministerial Declaration.  
 
The run up to Cancun entered into the final phase with the publishing of the draft 
Declaration of July 18, 2003 prepared by the Chairman of the General Council Mr. Perez 
Castillo. This was the first serious attempt to present a draft text that would facilitate 
discussion in Cancun and help the member countries to arrive at negotiated final 
Ministerial Declaration. The declaration came in the aftermath of the criticism in TNC 
Meeting [July 14-15, 2003] that delay in preparation of a draft will leave majority of the 
member countries from having a say in the draft declaration text to be prepared by the 
Chairman. The first draft was skeletal in nature and fractured in substance. Presence of 
so many brackets and dots reflected disagreements of the member countries on major 
issues. The draft text unbundled the Singapore Issues by way of incorporating separate 
articles in the declaration with options to negotiate or not to negotiate. Many countries 
and civil society organisations questioned the legitimacy of circulation of declaration at 
“Own Responsibility” of the Chairman. It is to be mentioned that the practice of 
circulation of text at Chairman’s own responsibility was first initiated in Geneva prior to 
the Doha Ministerial Meeting. 
 
A special session of the Committee on Agriculture was held on July 26, 2003, since it 
was being perceived that agriculture may turn out to be a “deal maker” or a “deal 
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breaker” in the Cancun. The EU-US Joint Statement on August 13, 2003 was initially 
considered to be a major breakthrough in the negotiations on agriculture. However, when 
the G-20 emerged with their own counter proposal it became clear that it would not be 
easy to come to a consensus in the negotiations on agriculture. The outstanding issues in 
agricultural negotiations were left to be decided through consultations at the political 
level in Cancun.  
 
A second draft was circulated by the Chairman on August 24, 2003 leaving almost no 
time for formal consultations as the last meeting of the General Council was scheduled to 
be held during August 25-26, 2003. The second draft offered a much improved text, with 
some flesh added to the skeleton of the first draft. The text provided a general framework 
on two major issues: agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA); however, 
targets, timeframes and deadlines were left blank. The draft was a significant 
advancement in terms of consolidating the outline of a successful Ministerial, although, 
diversity of the views of all the major parties was not reflected in this draft. The draft 
text was accompanied by seven Annexes on Agriculture, NAMA, S&DT and the four 
Singapore Issues. The text placed all controversies in the Annexes under the   
“Framework Approach” proposed by the US. The Four Singapore Annexes revealed the 
intention of the developed countries to achieve some negotiated decision on at least one 
of them: Investment, Competition Policy, Government Procurement and Trade 
Facilitation. The draft text started with the article on TRIPs and Public Health, perhaps in 
an attempt to highlight and showcase the early harvest of the Doha Development Round. 
Many member countries criticised the text “on chair’s responsibility” since it was 
perceived to undermine legitimacy and ignored the demand of the member countries on 
transparency and democratisation of the WTO procedures. According to most of the 
developing and LDC representatives in Cancun, despite the presence of Annex C on 
S&DT, “Development” was largely missing from the text.  
 
To sum up, Geneva went to Cancun with a number of unresolved issues in key areas, and 
it was left to the Ministers, prodded and guided by their Geneva Missions and also under 
pressure from their domestic lobbyists and pressure groups, to try to arrive at a 
declaration that was based on consensus. It was not going to be an easy task.  
MINISTERIAL MEETING 
Along with the member country delegations, the inaugural session held on September 10, 
2003 was attended by civil society representatives, and the media. Delegations from all 
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the 146 WTO member countries participated in the Cancun Ministerial Meeting. Around 
1700 delegates attended the Ministerial with observer status. Plenary Sessions were held 
all through five days of the Ministerial, in nine sessions where Ministers presented their 
views and articulated their positions and priorities. One of the major events of the 
Cancun Ministerial was the accession of two LDCs, Nepal and Cambodia, into the WTO.  
The process of official negotiation included working group meetings, “green room 
consultations”, meetings of Head of Delegations, and informal country consultations. 
The civil society organisations organised various side events in different venues. 
 
Following the inaugural session Mr Luis Ernesto Dervez, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mexico who was the Chairman of the Ministerial Meeting, announced the appointment 
of five Facilitators known as the Friends of the Chair. Singapore was appointed as 
Facilitator for Agriculture negotiations, Hong Kong for Non-agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA), Kenya for Trade and Development which included three major issues, 
commodity, implementation, and S&DT, Canada for the crucial Singapore Issues and 
Guyana was appointed as the Facilitator for Miscellaneous Issues which quickly came to 
be dubbed as the Cemetery Group. Concerns were expressed as regards the selection 
process of some of the Facilitators who had entrenched interests in particular issues. 
Working Groups were to be ‘open-ended’ i.e. all Members would be free to participate in 
the discussions being conducted. These Working Groups were to operate with 
transparency and inclusiveness.    
 
NEGOTIATIONS IN CANCUN 
 
Despite the fact that the Doha Round was dubbed the Doha Development Round to give 
emphasis to the ‘Development’ context of negotiations, the overarching approach of the 
Cancun Ministerial discussion was, to a large extent, based on the country agendas, 
approaches and priorities, rather than having the central focus on such issues as S&DT 
and implementations related issues. Thus the major emphasis was on negotiations on 
Agriculture, NAMA, and Singapore Issues. 
 
The draft declaration put forth by the Chairman of the General Council on August 24, 
2003 did not give exact numbers concerning cuts in domestic and export support. So, it 
was not clear how deep the agreed cuts would have been. Consequently, till the end it 
remained unclear to what extent the developed countries were willing to listen to the 
demands of developing countries and the LDCs regarding agricultural subsidies.  
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It was seen as a triumph by the developed countries that they were able to ensure 
inclusion of the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) on Special Products (SPs) in the 
Chairman’s draft.  
 
From the LDC perspective, the positive development was that these countries were 
exempted from tariff reduction commitments. However, the language was not definitive 
enough on the issue of providing zero-tariff market access to agricultural products from 
LDCs since the text was square bracketed in “shall” and “should” and thus its mandatory 
nature (a definitive shall) was left to be decided through negotiation in Cancun. 
 
The other problem in the Revision 2 was the inclusion of the extension of the so-called 
Peace Clause, which allows developed countries to carry on with their pre-Uruguay 
Round trade distorting measures in agricultural.  
 
The developing countries and the LDC members of the WTO had strong opinions 
concerning the wide ranging agricultural subsidies allowed under the Blue Box and 
Green Box provisions. Developed countries agreed to cap some of these, albeit at high 
threshold levels.  
 
In agriculture, the emergence of the G-21 was an important development of the Cancun 
Ministerial. As a matter of fact, a group of developing countries with similar views on a 
number of issues in Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) gradually began to emerge during 
the course of negotiations in Geneva. The Group was joined by others in Cancun. This 
group put in their concerted effort to provide language and number to the text [subsidy 
and tariff cuts formula] on agricultural market access. It was argued that the EU-US joint 
text lacked specificity since it left blank spaces where critical percentages and other hard 
figures were called for in terms of tariff reduction, reduction in domestic support and 
export credits. The G-21 proposal also excluded key elements of Harbinson’s Draft such 
as “Special Product (SP)” and Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) targeted for 
developing countries. Developing countries did not accept EU-US joint text and 
proposed: (i) to tighten rules to supervise the cuts in domestic subsidies to farmers in the 
US, Europe and Japan; (ii) to eliminate export subsidies; (iii) to go for deeper cuts in 
tariffs in developed countries to allow greater market access for exports from developing 
countries; and (iv) to lower tariff cuts for developing country’s food sectors so that they 
can maintain food security and promote rural development. Extension of Peace Clause 
disappointed G-21. 
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Non Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) 
 
In case of NAMA, there was a debate on whether to adopt a linear or a non-linear 
formula approach complemented by sectoral approach.  
 
The Revision 2, however, proposed a non-linear approach, taking note of the tariff peaks 
of different products. There was also a proposal as regards non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
with a view to identify, examine and categorise the NTBs. A deadline of October 31, 
2003 was proposed. Subsequently, negotiations were to start based on request-offer on 
horizontal or vertical approach. It was agreed that the LDCs would be exempted from 
such measures but they were expected to substantially expand the coverage and increase 
their level of binding commitments.  
 
Some of the developed states were in favour of “zero-for-zero” elimination of tariff. But 
the LDCs were calling for autonomous and predictable duty and quota free market access 
for non-agricultural products on non-reciprocal basis. 
 
One important development as regards LDC interests was that, there was a call for 
providing duty-free, quota-free market access to goods from LDCs within a stipulated 
deadline (the date was never mentioned). However, there were two caveats: this was to 
be achieved through bilateral initiatives, and it was not binding in nature with any fixed 
date. It is of interest that for the first time, the LDCs targeted not only the developed 
states but also the developing countries in their call for market access.  
 
There was also a mention about the WTO members to adopt and implement flexible 
rules of origin for exports from LDCs. But the formulation was of non-binding nature. 
 
Special and Differential Treatment 
 
Of the 88 demands for effective implementation of S&DT, 27 were included in the 
Revision 2 Annex C, while 6 of them were directly related to the LDCs. Here, amongst 
the issues of interest to the LDCs, the most important ones were related to follow-ups on 
provisions as regards rules of origin and free market access. However, these two issues 
were couched in relatively soft language. Moreover, because of ambiguities in the 
language there was scope for arbitrary implementation of these provisions by the 
developed countries and the issue of whether “all” LDCs would receive the preference 
remained somewhat unclear. 
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GATS   
A major development in Cancun was the introduction of the issue of movement of 
natural persons as service provider. Under services negotiations, the Ministerial took 
note of the interest of the developing and other countries in mode 4 under the GATS. 
However, this text was immediately followed by the stricture that members will have 
“the right to introduce new regulations to control such movement in pursuance of policy 
obligations”.  
 
However, the text in LDC paragraph is relatively strong, where it is stated that “we shall 
give special priority to the sectors and modes of supply of export interest to LDCs, 
particularly in regard to movement of service suppliers under mode 4”. This was 
perceived as an achievement in terms of recognition of a longstanding demand of some 
of the LDCs such as Bangladesh.  
 
However, in realising the draft text it would not have mattered much in terms of actual 
benefits unless the services classification included the less skilled category of services. 
Consideration of ISCO-88 list of occupations for inclusion into the GATS agreement 
was important in this context. Further more, without transparency in Economic Need 
Test (ENT) and equivalence of degrees and qualification requirements, market access for 




Singapore Issues turned out to be the red herring in Cancun talks. In the third draft, one 
of the four issues Competition, was side stepped by way of proposing continuation of the 
study phase. Two other issues, Transparency in Government Procurement and Trade 
Facilitation were put up for immediate commencement of negotiation. Launching of 
negotiations on Investment was de facto tagged to concessions on agriculture and 
NAMA, while allowing some time to clarify the modalities of its negotiation. 
 
In the final stage of Cancun talks, the European Union agreed to withdraw investment as 
an issue slated for negotiation. Government procurement was also under discussion for 
its withdrawal or for a more circumscribed formulation. 
But the entrenched positions of some of the developed countries such as South Korea 
and Japan in support of initiating negotiations on all the four issues vis-à-vis, “none at 
all” position of the LDCs and the developing countries created a serious deadlock. 
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Cotton Issue 
 
Cotton Issue was transformed into the “TRIPs and Public Health” issue of Cancun. The 
plight of the African cotton farmers, in the face of huge subsidies given particularly in 
the USA, was forcibly argued by the group of African countries and drew the 
imagination of the trade talk in Cancun.  
 
Although cotton was of vital interest to only 4 or 5 countries of Africa, the ‘Cotton Issue’ 
came to epitomise all the bad that is wrought on the economies of poorer countries by the 
huge subsidies given to the agriculture sector of developed countries.  
 
In theory Bangladesh could also initiate a similar campaign by portraying the possible 
negative impact of the MFA phase out particularly in terms of the livelihoods of the large 
number of female workers in its export-oriented RMG sector.  
 
Regrettably, the final draft on the Cotton Issue exposed a deep cynicism when instead of 
undertaking a targeted initiative for subsidy reduction, the concerned countries were 
advised by some of the developed countries to go for export diversification and value 
addition. US stand was cynically insensitive to the demand and expectations of the West 
and Central African countries on this issue.  The Implementation Issues also did not get 
due attention despite attempts by the LDCs and developing countries. 
  
EMERGENCE OF G-21 
 
In Cancun the emergence of G-21 was compared with the resurrection of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). The developed countries were somewhat taken aback since 
they did not expect such a broad-based coalition of the developing countries (G21) and 
LDCs to emerge during the run up and in the course of the Ministerial Meeting. The G-
21 played a leading role in Cancun talks, and the negotiators were better equipped and 
vocal. However, as anticipated interest of G-21 did not always match the interests of the 
LDCs. Major demands of G-21 were: 
 
  Support elimination of domestic subsidies that benefit corporations over small 
farmers and leads to global dumping in agriculture 
  Argue for exclusion of export credit from export subsidies 
  Addition of Fourth Pillar: Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism 
not specific to developing country 
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  Go for a concerted stance on Singapore Issues  
However, G-21 was silent on Implementation Issues and S&D 
 
THIRD DRAFT (Second Revision) 
 
The third draft was circulated in Cancun on September 13, 2003. The way it was 
structured in the backdrop of nerve-breaking negotiations on key issues, some countries 
argued that it was a deliberate step towards break down of negotiations. The text ignored 
the demand for EXPLICIT CONSENSUS
1 on Singapore Issues, and proposed for 
immediate negotiations on Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation. However, 
there was no change in the text on agriculture. On implementation related issues, the 
draft was a disappointment for the developing countries and the LDCs. The draft simply 
noted some “progress” in this regard and only instructed relevant bodies to “redouble” 
their efforts. Although proposal for adoption of 24 provisions was the initial harvest, 
these were without significant economic value. Fate of other 62 proposals, their timeline 




One of the important developments in Cancun was the accession of the two LDCs, Nepal 
and Cambodia. However, the accession schedules, which had been termed as WTO Plus, 
were seen to have discriminated against new members. Nepal tried to present a dignified 
posture, while Cambodia bluntly criticised the WTO in their acceptance speech. 
 
The consensus achieved in Geneva as regards TRIPs and Public Health issue was 
concerning (i) removal of obstacles from import of life saving drugs in order to increase 
their availability at reasonable and affordable prices from generic manufacturers; and (ii) 
accordance of technical and financial cooperation upon request.  
 
NEGOTIATIONS COLLAPSED  
 
The first three days of the Ministerial Meeting concentrated on negotiations on 
agriculture, NAMA and also on Singapore Issues. On September 14, the Chair called a 
meeting of nine countries to discuss Singapore Issues. In the morning an extended 
meeting was convened with participation of 30 countries to discuss only those issues 
where there were considerable differences among countries. The Foreign Minister of 
                                                 
1 It was the Doha mandate that the negotiations on Singapore Issues can be started only on the basis of the 
explicit consensus of all WTO members.  
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Mexico Mr Derbez, initiated the discussion by inviting country positions on the 
Singapore Issues. Majority of the countries proposed to keep the Singapore Issues for 
discussion at the review stage. Mr Derbez insisted that negotiations be initiated on Trade 
Facilitation and Government Procurement and he proposed to drop the other two 
Singapore Issues. Most of the delegates wanted to consult their capitals but failed to get 
new mandate and the meeting was suspended. When the meeting was reconvened the 
Ministers presented on their respective country positions. Based on his judgement, Mr 
Derbez concluded that as there was no possibility to reach consensus on Singapore 
Issues, there was no scope for agreement on the whole package. The Cancun Meeting 
collapsed.  
 
REASON FOR COLLAPSE 
 
It was interesting to note that for the first three days, the discussion moved around 
agriculture, which was an “offensive agenda” for the developing countries and the LDCs. 
But from the fourth day, the discussion moved on to the “defensive agenda” – the 
Singapore Issues – which ultimately turned out to be the decisive issue of the Ministerial 
Meeting. 
 
Opinions have differed as regards the reason for collapse of the Cancun Ministerial. 
While some wondered that it failed on a particular issue, others attributed the failure to 
lack of adequate time to bridge the difference. One legitimate question was raised 
regarding the justification of such a provocative text on Singapore Issues in absence of 
any EXPLICIT CONSENSUS. At the same time, there was no new development in the 
third draft on agriculture and this was unacceptable to the G-21. There was no progress 
on modalities on NAMA negotiations either. “Cotton Issue” which raised a lot of 
sympathy in Cancun was cynically gunned down and this did not create a conducive 
environment. Only on “Environment” a new article was included, which was related to 
the decision to invite International Institutions according to Para 31 of the negotiations. 
There were some improvements in the LDC text but frustration prevailed among the 
LDCs because of the inclusion of Singapore Issues and inadequate treatment of S&DT 
and implementation related issues. (The third draft made everyone unhappy! However, 
some (G-21 & LDCs) were more unhappy than the others.) 
 
As mentioned earlier, Singapore Issues turned out to be the red herring in Cancun talks. 
Apparently, contrary to popular perceptions, the discussions broke down not on the issue 
Interpreting Cancun: Experience and Lessons for Bangladesh    14CPD Occasional Paper Series 27  
of unwarranted agricultural subsidies in the developed countries, but owing to reluctance 
of the developing countries and the LDCs to include new issues in the negotiation basket. 
It was interesting to note that in the third draft the deadline for negotiations on Singapore 
Issues was tagged with timeline for negotiations on agriculture subsidy and NAMA. 
There is a widespread belief that the developed countries took resort to a strategy 
whereby they tried to divert attention from agriculture by introducing a provocative text 
on Singapore Issues.  
 
GAIN OR LOSS  
 
Opinion as regards whether collapse of Cancun is a gain or loss is divided. Some believe 
that ‘No deal’ is better than a ‘Bad Deal’; others believe that ‘Something is better than 
nothing’. Some are of the opinion that something good is likely to emerge from the 
collapse. Firstly, the collapse of Cancun talks will lead to a refocus of attention on the 
developmental aspects of the Doha Development Round. Secondly, the outcome of 
Cancun proved that ‘concerted critical engagement’ can act as a deterrent to ‘pressure’ 
by powerful members. The collapse of negotiations at Cancun led to a rediscovery of 
new strength of the developing countries.  
 
On the negative side, whilst struggling for incremental gains, the gains made through 
hard negotiations in Geneva and Cancun were lost, at least for the time being. Given the 
emerging situation it remains uncertain whether the developed nations are going to 
renege on their own proposals and rollback their offers made in Cancun. 
 
There is an apprehension that the failure of talks in Cancun will usher in an era of 
ascendancy of Bilateralism as opposed to Multilateralism. Bilateralism has its own 
pitfalls, especially for small trading partners dealing with powerful ones. The concept of 
consensus based decision-making of the WTO may come under attack and such 
apprehension appears to be not without justification when immediately after the 
breakdown of the talks, EU’s Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy termed the WTO 
decision-making process as “mediaeval”, and argued for changing it.  
 
CANCUN OUTCOME: WHAT IT MEANT FOR THE LDCS  
 
Within the tension of the mainstream negotiations of the Cancun Ministerial, the third 
draft text did include some of the expectations of the LDCs. In agriculture, the text 
proposed exemption from all reduction commitments including the requirement to 
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reduce  de minims domestic support. The text also talks of duty free and quota free 
market access though the language is ambiguous [shall/should]. The draft also provided 
text on indication for granting, on an autonomous basis, duty free and quota free market 
access, though without any time line. During the run up to the Cancun, the adoption of 
LDC modalities was a positive development. The draft also included text on priority to 
be given to Mode 4 under GATS but without clarification on market access barriers as 
regards movement of natural persons. The draft also included a text on flexibility of 
Rules of Origin and effective capacity building and technical assistance under Integrated 
Framework (IF), but in a language that is not binding in nature. However, on the whole 
the LDC paragraph and also other parts in the text that concerning developing countries 
of the third draft was more substantive compared to the earlier versions. 
CANCUN AND BANGLADESH 
 
Bangladesh’s participation in Cancun Ministerial reflected the incremental progress in 
terms of domestic capacity building. Bangladesh Mission in Geneva played a proactive 
role in  various negotiating committees which discussed issues of interest to Bangladesh. 
A number of proposals were submitted on a number of issues. Bangladesh identified and 
prioritised their issues of interests in the light of Dhaka Declaration. A number of 
consultation meetings were held through WTO Advisory Committee at the Ministry of 
Commerce and 5 Working Groups under the Advisory Committee; thematic Task Forces 
prepared a number of background papers. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) such as 
the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) and Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) are 
members in the  Advisory Committee and a number of Working Groups. Both of these 
organisations prepared a number of policy briefs as a contribution to the design of 
Bangladesh’s negotiating stance. Participation of Bangladesh media in Cancun also 
increased the visibility of Bangladesh’s effort in the Ministerial.  
 
Bangladesh was invited to be one of the three vice-chairs of the Ministerial. As such she 
had to play three roles: a global role as a vice chair, a partisan role as an LDC leader, and 
her own national role. Bangladesh probably tried to uphold previously agreed two major 
national priorities -- market access of industrial products and temporary movement of 
service providers. 
 
On many issues Bangladesh’s position and priorities did not necessarily match with 
those of other LDCs. African LDCs who were more focused on agriculture subsidy, were 
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more reticent about Singapore Issues compared to Bangladesh. On the other hand 
Bangladesh was more concerned with market access for industrial goods, flexibility in 
the Rules of Origin and movement of natural persons. Thus Bangladesh was relatively 
more interested in the negotiations on NAMA and GATS although on Singapore Issues 
she remained ambivalent. As the vice-chair Bangladesh had the added responsibility of 
trying to steer the negotiations to a consensus based conclusion which also demanded 
more flexibility.  
 
Bangladesh tried to pursue a negotiating stance in line with the Dhaka Declaration of the 
LDC Ministers. However, within the prevailing realities in Cancun, she was ready to 
show more flexibility on a number of key issues which did not necessarily follow the line 






Bangladesh’s Interests were not always similar to those of Other LDCs  
  Bangladesh’s priority on Textile & Clothing issues vs. priority on Cotton Issues by 
African LDCs 
  Duty-free and quota free market access: Bangladesh’s Priority Interest 
 TRIPs and Public Health: Import Interests of Africa and Export Interest of Bangladesh 
  Temporary Movements of Natural Persons: Bangladesh's Interest vis-à-vis allegation of 
Brain Drain by some African LDCs 
Bangladesh chaired three of the nine Plenary Sessions. This time as a vice chair of the 
meeting, Bangladesh got access to the green room consultations, although it should be 
pointed out that unlike earlier Ministerial Meetings there was a visible effort to make the 
process inclusive. However, a need for better coordination between Dhaka and Geneva 
was felt during the negotiations.  
 




The emergence of G-21 plus as a strong bargaining lobby, the hard-hitting strategy of the 
EU and USA, the emergence of Singapore Issues as a deal breaker in Cancun are 
developments that will need to be taken cognisance in the coming days and months. 
More fundamental issues have been pushed upfront by what happened in Cancun: (a) 
The Future of the Multi-lateral Process, (b) WTO Governance, and  (c) The Work 
Programme under the Doha Development Round Agenda. 
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Reactions of the major players give indications of a slow down the Multilateral System 
and increasing resort to Bilateralism in trade negotiations.   
 
As both the developing and the developed country members in WTO are unhappy about 
the WTO decision - making process, the process itself may come under scrutiny in near 
future. Increasing use of discretion by the Chair raised legitimate questions as regards 
whether WTO is a Chair-Driven or a Member-Driven organisation. Cancun witnessed 
how Chairs can undermine the potential gains through protracted negotiation by acting 
on their “Own Responsibility”. The decision about the selection of countries as Friends 
of the Chair and transparency and inclusiveness of green room consultations also left 
room for dissatisfaction on the part of the developing country members of the WTO.  
 
As regards the WTO work programme, Cancun decided on a deadline for achieving a 
consensus on resuming the negotiation process. It remains to be seen whether Geneva 
will be able to make progress on the issues on which the political leaders failed to arrive 
at a consensus. Geneva process will be led by bureaucrats who will need flexible 
mandate from their respective capitals. Furthermore, the fate of the Cancun Draft is still 
unclear. It is important to sort out which one of the followings will be the point of 
reference for the Geneva process -  
  
  Revision-1 (of August 24, 2003) Draft 
  Revision-2 (of September 13, 2003) Draft 
  Negotiate on each issue on the basis of the relevant propositions in the above two 
Drafts. 
 
CANCUN OUTCOME: FUTURE SCENARIOS 
 
Following the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial talks there is widespread apprehension 
that the deadline for completing the negotiations under the DDRA (January 1, 2005) will 
not be met. In all probabilities the deadlines will need to be extended to accommodate 
the new realities. Some of the countries may as well seek  reconsideration of the WTO 
decision-making process, going as far as a call for IMF-WB style weighted voting 
system. However, such a proposal is likely to face stiff resistance from most of the 
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Lessons for Bangladesh from the Cancun Process  
 
  Although the discussion in the Cancun Ministerial was more open, transparent 
and inclusive compared to the earlier Ministerial Meetings, the developed 
countries and blocs such as USA and the EU continue to wield decisive power 
within the system.  
  Cancun demonstrated that when developing countries come together with around 
well-thought out proposals, they could turn themselves into a powerful force 
which has to be reckoned with.  
  In any future negotiations, the Singapore Issues are likely to become a major 
centre of discussion and countries will need to decide on the trade-offs they are 
ready to accept.  
  Although there are a number of common issues of interest which unite the LDCs, 
there are substantial differences in the approaches and priorities amongst them.  
  The second revision of the Chairman’s Draft, prepared after severe criticism of 
the first draft, shows that if the LDCs can keep up the pressure, the system can 
not avoid responding to the LDC needs and concerns.  
  There is a need to identify the preferential treatment clauses offered to the LDCs 
under the various S&DT provisions. Accordingly, the “will” and “shall” 
wordings, time bound deadlines and concreteness of the articulations will need to 
be carefully studied by the LDCs and it needs also to be ensured that their 
interests are appropriately reflected both in the texts and Annexes in a more 
concretised fashion.  
  As can be increasingly observed, there is a growing tendency and effort amongst 
the developed countries to bring down their differences as regards major areas of 
conflicts of interest such as Agriculture. This may as well be a reactive strategy to 
counter the newly emerging alliances of the developing countries. This is likely 
to create renewed pressure on Bangladesh and other LDCs to fall in line with the 
proposals that emerge out of such alliances.  
  Inspite of the inconclusive end of the Cancun Ministerial, all the WTO member 
countries, barring exception, are keen to salvage the WTO talks. Bangladesh 
should take appropriate preparations keeping this in mind. 
  The WTO member countries will need to arrive at agreements as regards 
modalities before December 15, 2003, as per the decision of the Cancun 
Ministerial Meeting. Substantive discussion will need to be conducted on the 
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various areas of the DDRA in order to finish the work agendas of the missed 
deadlines and the newly negotiated deadlines. In the near future Bangladesh will 
need to carry out appropriate preparatory work to firm up its country stance with 
regard to the various negotiating agendas on the table as mandated under the 
DDRA.  
 
CANCUN OUTCOME: WHAT BANGLADESH SHOULD DO 
 
  Make best use of the breathing space in order to adequately prepare for 
negotiations in Geneva in view of the December 15, 2003 deadline and beyond  
  Give adequate emphasis on Bilateral engagements and negotiations 
  Revisit LDC Strategies with a forward-looking approach  
  Look for strategic alliance with G-21on particular issues  
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